



During World War I, helping to finance bur-
geoning government deficits at low rates of
interest became the overriding objective of
Federal Reserve "credit policy", and Treasury
Secretary William McAdoo, in his capacity as ex
officio member (and Chairman) ofthe Federal
Reserve Board exerted a strong influence. This
Letter reviews the System's wartime credit policy
and subsequent developments during the
decade ofthe 1920s. These include its efforts to
deal with the initial post-war inflation and reces-
sion, a reversion to the falacious "real bills"
doctrine which underlay the original Federal
Reserve Act, and the Federal Reserve's "great
discovery" - that purchases and sales of
securities in the open market influence the level
ofeconomic activity.
Accommodating the Treasury
The Fed's initial three years coincided with the
period of neutrality prior to America's entry into
the World War in April 1917. During that time,
demand deposits and currency increased by
about 40 percent largely in response to an influx
of gold from Europe. This influx, combined with
war-related demands, raised wholesale prices at
a comparable rate. Following America's entry
into the war, government spending rose dramat-
ically-from less than $2 billion in 1917 to
almost $19 billion in 1919. However, the jump
in spending was financed to only a small extent
by a rise in tax revenues; the rest was financed
by borrowing.
Treasury Secretary William McAdoo was ex
officio Chairman ofthe Federal Reserve Board,
and under his urging, accommodation ofthe
Treasury's war financing requirements became
the overriding objective of the Fed's "credit pol-
icy". Federal Reserve Bank discount rates were
kept relatively low to encourage member banks
to borrow to buy more government debt and to
increase their loans to individuals and busi-
nesses for the same purposes. To further this
objective, the Federal Reserve Act was amended
in 1917 to reduce member bank reserve
requirements.
The resulting rise in bank lending helped finance
an increase in government debt from $1 billion
to $25 billion by mid-1919, an increase which
was accompanied by an additional 35 percent
rise in the money supply and a 40 percent
increase in prices within a two-year period.
Back to normalcy
The economic boom continued for a year and a
halffollowing the Armistice in November 1918,
and was accompanied by continued growth in
member bank borrowing from the Reserve Banks
and continued rapid growth in the money sup-
ply and prices. The Reserve Banks strongly
favored an increase in their discount rates to
curb inflation and growing speculation.
However, through its key influence and position
on the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury late
in 1919 successfully opposed an increase on the
grounds that its "Victory Loan" refunding opera-
tions were not complete.
Nevertheless, the monetary basis of inflation did
receive tacit recognition at the Board as well as
at the Reserve Banks. In January 1920, Board
member A. C. Miller warned that "prices will go
up as long as the increase in the supply of
money proceeds at a faster rate than the supply
of goods." He also noted that "excessive bor-
rowing by the government has been the main
cause ofthe excessive increase in the volume of
purchasing media."
Following the resignation of Carter Glass (who
had replaced William McAdoo as Treasury Sec-
retary and Board Chairman) to accept appoint-
ment as a Senator early in 1920, the Treasury
advised the Board that Fed policy no longer
need be directed at accommodating Treasury
debt operations. As a result, System (essentially
Reserve Bank) policy turned to implementing the
single policy objective stipulated by the Federal
Reserve Act - namely, setting discount rates
with a view to "accommodating commerce and
business."
This meant limiting new credit extensions
through the discount window to "productive"
uses, that is, the discounting of "self-liquidating"
and "eligible" commercial, industrial and agri-
cultural paper. However, as events were to
prove, this "real bills" doctrine and the "accom-
modation" objective which governed the think-
ing in the Federal Reserve Act falaciously
assumed that funds derived from the discounting
of "eligible paper" would be used only for "pro-
ductive" purposes.
In response to their growing concern over the
"unprecedented orgy ofextravagance, mania for
speculation and overextended business" which
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they attributed to "the wartime policy of abnor-
mally low rates," the Reserve Banks, with Board
approval, raised their discount rates early in
1920 and generally maintained them at a 6V2 - 7
percent level through the middle of 1921, when
they were gradually reduced to 4V2 - 5 percent
in the fall.
In the spring of 1920, a recession began as com-
modity speculation and prices broke sharply,
partly in response to dramatic readjustments
throughoutthe world, including a sharply
reduced demand for American farm products.
Wholesale prices fell by about 40 percent
through 1921, accompanied by declines of 30
percent in Fed economic indices (among the first
to be developed) of "business volume" and
"manufacturing volume." A 75 percent drop in
government spending from its wartime inflated
level in 1919 also contributed strongly to the
economic recession.
Throughout the downturn in 1920 and notwith-
standing the higher level of discount rates, mem-
ber bank borrowings from the Reserve Banks
rose sharply, as did the volume of Federal
Reserve notes in circulation. However, member
banks, concerned over their substantial debt to
the Fed, began repaying their borrowings late in
1920, and substantial reductions occurred in
1921 in spite of a lowering of discount rates.
Throughout these events, the Fed demonstrated
an essentially passive view of its functions
(within the general constraints ofthe gold stan-
dard), namely, "accommodating commerce and
business/' The Federal Reserve Board's 1921
Annual Report noted that an increase or
decrease in volume ofmember bank borrowings
and ofFederal Reserve notes in circulation "is
not the result of any pre-ordained policy (but)
depends entirely upon the activity (demands) of
business." It added that the System "cannot,
however skillful its administration maybe, pre-
vent periods of depression, although it can do
much to modify them." John Perrin, the Chair-
man ofthe San Francisco Fed, argued that
"deflation for the sake of correcting injustices
wroughtby inflation is not one ofthe purposes
of theFederal Reserve System."
"A conspiracy that didn't occur"
As a result ofthe 1921 recession, the System
was accused of a deliberate conspiracy-"a
conspiracy that didn't occur," in the words of
CarterGlass - to raise interestrates in order to
force a deflation. To this day some Fed critics
assert that a depression was deliberately pro-
grammed at a "secret meeting" of Board and
Reserve Bank officials and Directors on May 18,
1920. However, the published minutes of the
meeting and a statement of Governor W.P.G.
Harding ofthe Federal Reserve Board refute this
view. Governor Harding noted that "a sensible
and gradual liquidation (of speculative credit)
will result in a permanent improvement... but
any attempt at radical or drastic deflation will
result in very serious consequences."
A Congressional investigating committee subse-
quently supported the System's actions, but crit-
icized it for not having acted independently of
the Treasury more quickly.
The great discovery
There were other results of the System's efforts to
help the nation (in President Harding's words)
"get back to normalcy." The huge wartime
increase in government debt caused Fed officials
to become increasingly aware ofthe implica-
tions of their actions - and those ofthe Treas-
ury - for the economy. In 1922, the Reserve
Banks organized a committee - without repre-
sentation ofthe Federal Reserve Board - to
centralize and coordinate their individual pur-
chases and sales of government securities in the
open market through the New York Fed. They
did this upon discovering that their so-called
open market operations, which were undertaken
separately simply to provide them with a source
of earnings, were exerting perceptible effects
upon interest rates and economic activity.
Using the reserve position of member banks and
the call-loan rate as barometers, a policy gradu-
ally developed to use both the discount "win-
dow" and open-market operations to offset
"seasonal" swings in business activity.
The following year, the Board, exercising its
supervisory authority over the Reserve Banks'
"open market operations" as provided for by the
Federal Reserve Act, reorganized the Reserve
Banks' "Open Market Investment Committee"
over the strong objections of other Reserve Bank
officials. Committee membership was limited to
the New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland
and Chicago Reserve Banks, under Board super-
vision that involved formal approval ofthe Com-
mittee's policy recommendations.
The basic Systemobjective continued to be the
purchase and sale of government securities and
commercial paper "with primary regard to the
accommodation of commerce and business."
However, it was still left to individual Reserve
Banks, including those that wer.e not members of
the Committee, to decide whether to participate
in operations decided upon by the Committee.Smoke gets in your eyes
As the System's knowledge ofpolicy tools and
mechanisms broadened in the 19205, so did its
effectiveness in using these tools to stabilize the
economy. From 1921 to 1929, the money sup-
ply grew about 5 percent a year (the policy
focus was on credit conditions, not on the
money supply as such) and was accompanied
by a 35 percent growth in the nation's real
(inflation-adjusted) income in the context of vir-
tual price stability - an achievement
unmatched in any comparable period before or
since.
These achievements, however, masked some
serious underlying weaknesses that became
increasingly evident as the decade progressed.
These weaknesses included the continued loss
of foreign markets for American farm produce,
mounting bank suspensions, especially in rural
areas (some 5,000 banks failed during the 1920s
prior to the Crash), and the growing reluctance
of private lenders to continue to lend abroad.
This situation culminated in numerous defaults
as foreign borrowers, including governments,
found it increasingly difficult to raise funds to
service their large wartime and post-war borrow-
ings from the U.S.
Between the devil and the deep blue sea
The principal policy dilemma faced by the Sys-
tem was how to provide for the "legitimate" and
"productive" credit needs ofthe economy with-
out at the same time financing "nonproductive"
uses. Nonproductive uses included speculation
in the stock market, which began in 1924 and
saw stock prices almost quadruple prior to the
Crash in 1929. This dilemma prompted one
Reserve Bank Governor in 1924 to comment to
a Congressional Committee that the System was
caught "between the devil and the deep blue
sea."
President Coolidge declared that speculation on
the stock market was not cause for apprehen-
sion. But, to heighten awareness of the situation,
the Reserve Banks began publishing data on
member bank broker loans in 1926. In 1928, it
began to curtail lending to member banks that
already had a large volume offunds in the stock
market, even though such financing, including
stock underwriting, was then legal. In 1928, dis-
count rates were raised and a large amount of
government debt sold in an unsuccessful effort
to dampen renewed speculative fever.
However, as the San Francisco Fed noted in its
1929 Annual Report to the Federal Reserve
Board, this tack could not forestall major sources
of stock market lending, including direct lending
by corporations with large cash balances and
lending by non-member banks. Even member
banks could escape Fed control simply by
bypassing the Reserve Banks and purchasing
federal funds (reserves of other banks) to
increase their broker loans.
The Fed at that time did not have authority to
vary member bank reserve requirements or to
impose stock margin requirements. (There was
no Securities and Exchange Commission until
1934.) And many observers concluded that
reserves acquired by the banking system as a
result of open-market purchases inevitably found
their way into the stock market.
Early in 1929, several of the Reserve Banks
requested Board approval of increases in their
discount rates, and the New York Fed pleaded
for permission to raise its discount rate by sev-
eral increments to 10 percent, if necessary, to
brake speculative fever. However, a majority of
the Federal Reserve Board balked at the request
on the grounds thatit was not the System's right
to act as "an arbiter of security speculation or
values" or to "regulate the stock exchange,"
and that increases were not warranted by under-
lying economic conditions. It was not until
Augustthat the Board reluctantly approved an
increase in the New York Fed's discount rate
from 5 to 6 percent. It was the last increase
before the Crash.
Conclusion
While the decade ofthe "Roaring Twenties"
was thus marked by some notable economic
achievements, including a significant evolution
in the System's awareness of the means by
which it could influence the economy, it ended
as it had begun, inauspiciously. Asa rapidly fail-
ing economic barometerwas to prove, stormy
weather was on the way. A future Letter will dis-
cuss developments during the 1930s.
Verle B. Johnston, Legislative.Analyst
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily reflect theviews oftile managementof the Federal Reserve Bank ofSan
Francisco, orofthe Board ofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorialcommentsmaybeaddressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....FreecopiesofFederal Reserve publications
can beobtainedfrom the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
94120. Phone(415) 974-2246.uo~6U!4S0m 4o~n U060JO 0pOA0U





BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 200,246 -1,136 12,347 6.5
Loans and Leases1 6 180,914 -1,233 11,150 6.5
Commercial and Industrial 52,149 - 424 - 7 0.0
Real estate 66,192 105 3,860 6.1
Loans to Individuals 38,573 - 96 6,026 18.5
Leases 5,682 55 391 7.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities 11,020 100 - 139 - 1.2
OtherSecurities2 8,312 - 3 1,334 19.1
Total Deposits 198,892 -2,293 5,747 2.9
Demand Deposits 46,184 -1,941 1,897 4.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 32,135 77 2,651 8.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,930 - 297 2,036 15.7
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,778 - 55 1,815 1.3
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 45,683 - 22 2,055 4.7
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000 ormore 38,394 - 7 - 667 - 1.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 24,066 - 953 4,495 22.9
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change